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ABSTRACT 
Relative to traditional piecewise linear income taxation schemes, it is possible to 
increase government revenues by offering to consumers a menu of linear income tax 
schedules.  In the resulting Pareto-superior equilibrium, consumers sort themselves out 
according to their (unobservable) productivity level, with high productivity agents choosing 
the tax schedules with low marginal tax rate and high intercept.  This scheme extracts from 
the economy  an  unexploited source of  revenue which, in contrast with standard supply-side 
proposals, does not depend  on the economy being on the downward-sloping side of the Laffer 
curve. 
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Lump sum income taxes, while non distortionary, are considered undesirable be- 
cause of their regressivity. Thus, in designing income tax schedules, benevolent 
governments face a trade-off between  the efficiency cost of distorting  labor sup- 
ply decisions and the distributional benefit of progressivity (or proportionality) of 
the tax burden.1 
In most developed countries,  including the United States, income tax sched- 
ules are progressive and take, undoubtedly for simplicity, the form of continuous 
piecewise linear functions.2 In this paper, we demonstrate that any fiscal system 
with a continuous  linear  (or piecewise linear)  tax schedule can be Pareto im- 
proved by the introduction  of a second  tax  schedule, and by letting the taxpayers 
select their preferred tax function on the menu of linear schedule presented to 
them. The additional tax schedule should have a lower marginal rate than the 
first one and a higher intercept.  In more colorful terms, by introducing  the  second 
tax schedule, the government  offers to "sell" a reduction of the marginal tax rate 
for the price of a lower lump sum transfer (the higher intercept of the new tax 
schedule). The tax payers who select to "buy" the reduction  in the marginal rate, 
i.e., who choose the new tax  schedule, will be the most productive workers: under 
the new tax schedule they will work and consume more, and some (or all) of  them 
will pay more taxes. In fact, we derive simple conditions which insure that the 
Pareto improving introduction  of the second tax schedule does not reduce total 
tax revenues. More generally, additional revenue-neutral  or revenue-increasing 
Pareto improvements can be achieved by offering to the tax payers a menu of  ]V 
linear tax schedules (with N greater than two). The only limit to the number of 
schedules is the complexity of the tax system. It should  be stressed that, in con- 
trast with standard supply-side arguments, this Pareto improving increase in tax 
revenues can be achieved  even if the economy is on the upward sloping side  of 
the Laffer curve and  the additional fiscal revenue is wasted. These results hold 
under assumptions on utility  functions which are quite general and standard in 
the optimal taxation  literature. 
Our results can be viewed as a practical proposal to implement the "no distor- 
tions at the top" principle.3 We show that a version of this principle  may often be 
applied "globally"  so as to offer lower marginal income tax rates to a substantial 
1.  On the theory of income  taxation, see Mirrlees  [1977],  Sadka  [1977], Seade [19771  and 
Atkinson  and Stiglitz  [1980]. 
2.  See Sheshinski  [1972] and Sheshinski  [1989] on the theory of optimal linear tax schedules. 
3.  Sadka [1977], Seade [19771. Linear Mcome tax schedules  2 
fraction of the population—without  affecting government revenues or relying 
on supply-side effects. We provide simple conditions under which this ensuing 
Pareto-improvement  can be implemented for linear tax schedules. 
Our results on the welfare benefits of a menu of linear income taxes are reminis- 
cent of some recent theoretical  developments in the principal-agent literature, 
which analyzes a situation  where a principal employs agents without being able 
to observe their effort. Laffont and Tirole  [1986]  show that under certain con- 
ditions and with specific functional forms, the optimal contract is one in which 
the principal offers a menu of wage functions which are linear in output and the 
agents  are free to choose any of these functions as their contract. The analogy be- 
tween our results and those of Laffont and Tirole is that, in both cases, the menu 
of opportunities is such that high productivity workers choose to work more. In 
the principal-agent situation this occurs because by doing so high productivity 
workers take advantage of  a more profitable wage function; in the case of income 
taxes they take advantage of lower marginal tax rates, even though  they may pay 
more taxes in the end. 
It should  be pointed out that results similar to ours have been obtained indepen- 
dently by Slemrod et al.  [1991]. 
This  paper is organized as follows. In Section  1 we introduce  the  model and review 
the standard  case with a single linear income tax schedule, Section 2 shows how 
a menu of linear income tax schedules may improve welfare without reducing tax 
revenues. In Section 3 we develop a numerical example and discuss the empirical 
relevance of our proposal. Section 4  discusses several extensions. The last section 
concludes. 
1  Unique linear income tax schedule 
In this section we analyze, to fix the notation and for future reference, the equi- 
librium in the presence of a unique linear income tax schedule. We describe first 
the behavior of consumers and of the government,  and then characterize  the 
equilibrium. 3  Alesina & Weil 
1.1  Consumers 
The economy consists of one-period lived consumers-workers who differ only in 
their labor productivity, w.4 Let F(w) denote the cumulative distribution  func- 
tion of productivities. Clearly, F(0) = 0, F(c) = 1 and j'00° wdF(w) = 1. 
We assume that all agents are  productive (w > 0). Productivity is truly exogenous 
(a consumer cannot choose to be less productive), and cannot be unobserved by 
fiscal authorities. 
All consumers have an equal unit endowment of leisure time, and rank bundles 
of consumption  (c)  and  labor (I) according to the same utility function  u(c, I), 
with u1  > 0 and u2  < 0. In addition to strict quasi-concavity, differentiability, 
monotonicity and local non-satiation  of u(.,.) in c and 1 — I, we impose: 
Assumption 1 
1imui(c,t)=+c VIE (0,1) 
lirnu2(c,t)=+c' Vc>0 
Assumption 2 




— U2U12 <0 and  u2u11 — U1U12  > 0. 
Assumption 4 
u  + (uiuj2 
— u2uii)t > 0. 
4.  We could as well study consumers who only differ in their tastes. What matters  is that we 
restrict ourselves, for simplicity, to one-dimensional  heterogeneity. Our  notation closely follows 
Sheshinski  [19891. Linear income tax schedules  4 
The first assumption rules out corner solutions at zero for consumption  or leisure. 
The second assumption guarantees  that, at a consumption  optimum,  all con- 
sumers work a strictly positive number  of hours.5 The third assumption ensures 
that consumption and leisure are normal goods, and the fourth  implies that opti- 
mum labor supply increases with the wage rate and decreases with the marginal 
tax rate on labor income. 
One can think of consumers agents as yeoman farmers with different production 
functions; the production function of a consumer-worker of productivity  w is 
q = wL Alternatively, one  can imagine that the consumption good is produced 
by competitive firms which employ different types of labor, with one unit of type 
w labor input yielding w units of output; in that interpretation, assuming that 
firms can perfectly monitor their workers' marginal product, w is the unit wage 
of consumer w. There is no capital. 
1.2  Government 
The government is modelled as an entity (possibly a social planner) which must 
raise enough tax revenue to  finance an  exogenously determined  supply of a public 
good which is not an argument of the consumers' utility function. As we shall be 
exclusively concerned  with revenue-increasing and Pareto-improving changes in 
the tax structure, we avoid the arbitrariness of explicitly specifring, in this econ- 
omy  with heterogeneous agents and without voting, the social planner's objective 
function. We however limit ourselves (and therefore limit the fisc) to the class 
linear income tax schemes. 
Suppose that there is a unique linear income tax schedule 'r 
t=—a+(1—/3)y.  (1.1) 
Taxes paid by a consumer with income y have accordingly two components:  a 
lump-sum transfer a > 0  (a lump-sum tax if a < 0), and  a distortionary la- 
bor income tax at the marginal rate 1 —  E  [0, 1]. Note that the tax system is 
progressive when a > 0. 
5.  If one feels  uncomfortable  with  this restriction  on the utility  function,  one can alterna- 
tively stipulate, instead  of assumption  1,  that productivity  levels are bounded from below by 
lim_o[fluz(c, £)]/[ui(c, £)]. Either assumption will rule out non-active workers. 5  Alesina & Weil 
The social planner sets the tax structure taking into account the reaction of the 
consumers. Taxes cannot be changed after labor supply and consumption deci- 
sions have been taken. 
Tax revenues are constrained  to finance the exogenous government  expenditure 
G> 0:6 
R = j t(y*) dF(w) ￿ G,  (1.2) 
where yt = y(,  /3w) denotes the equilibrium labor income of a consumer of 
productivity w  who faces tax schedule r. 
1.3  Equilibrium and comparative  statics 
A  consumer of  type w maximizes u(c,  £) subject to the constraint that consump- 
tion cannot exceed after-tax labor income: 
c￿c+/9wi,  (1.3) 
and that 
c￿0 ,  £E[0,1].  (1.4) 
Because  of  assumption 2,  and  assuming  that the following  second-order condition 
holds 
(/3w)2uii + 2/3wu12 + u22  0,  (1.5) 
the solution to this problem is unique and interior for every w, and satisfies the 
first-order condition: 
/3wui + U2 = 0.  (1.6) 
Let c* = c(c, /3w) and £* = £(,  /3w) denote that solution. Because of assump- 
tion 3, optimal consumption  and leisure increase when the lump-sum transfer c 
increases: 
c  > 0  and  £  <0,  (1.7) 
where,  for instance, c  denotes  Oc/Oa. 
Because of assumption 4, optimal labor supply increases as the marginal tax rate 
1 —  /3 decreases or as productivity w rises: 
£ > 0.  (1.8) 
6.  As we choose to abstract ourselves from intertemporal  considerations,  we assume that all 
expenditures  are tax-financed. Linear  income tax schedules  6 
This obviously implies that pre-tax labor income rises with productivity. 
The maximum utility attained  by a consumer of  type w is  therefore u  = u(c*, £). 
Using the envelope theorem, 
8u* 
—=u1 and _=wl*uj.  (1.9) 
Oct  0/3 
Taxes paid, at the optimum, by a consumer of type w are 
tt = —a +  (1 
— /3)e*.  (1.10) 
As a consequence, 
=  —1+(1—/3)wt<O  (1.11) 
=  w[(1—$)wt—t].  (1.12) 
2  A menu of linear income tax schedules 
Now suppose that the flsc introduces a second  linear income tax  schedule, and of- 
fers to taxpayers a choice between  two schedules. The first schedule,  T = (a, /3), 
is the one described in the previous section. The second  schedule, r' = (a',  p3'), 
proposes to consumers a lower marginal tax rate (/3' > /3) in exchange for a lower 
lump-sum transfer (a' < a). In others terms, tax authorities sell at a "price" of 
p = a — a'> 0 the right to a lower marginal tax rate. 
The introduction  of this second tax schedule cannot but be Pareto-improving.7 
The welfare of consumers who do not wish to take advantage of the opportunity 
to buy a reduction in their marginal tax rate is unaffected, while the utility level 
reached by taxpayers who choose to use the new tax schedule r' is necessarily 
higher (they would not otherwise choose the new schedule). 
A decrease in the marginal tax rate from 1 — /3 to 1  — /3' does not provide the 
same utility benefit  to all consumers: highly productive consumers (those with a 
7.  Strictly speaking, introducing  this second schedule cannot lead to a Pareto-inferior  equilib- 
rium. As we  shall see below, one can however always construct r' in such  a  way that it makes at 
least one consumer strictly better off. 7  Alesina & Well 
high w) value it more than low productivity workers. Because the cost for this 
reduction  in the marginal rate is the same (p) for all consumers,8 only consumers 
with a high enough  productivity, for whom benefit  exceeds cost, will choose the 
new tax schedule. 
The central point of this paper is that, for any initial tax schedule, for any income 
distribution  and for any desired reduction in  the marginal tax rate, one can  always 
find a reduction  pin the lump-sum transfer component  of the tax which will result 
in increased tax revenues—provided taxpayers are presented with both the r and 
r' schedule. 
The formal proof, which we now  present, follows the logic of the preceding verbal 
argument. 
2.1  Welfare 
Let  > 0 be the income level at which both tax schedules produce the same 
revenue  [i.e., T and i-' intersect at (,i) in (y,t) space]: 
—a+(1—8)=—c'+(1—/3')=.  (2.1) 
For a given initial tax schedule r and a given  ,  the second tax schedule r' is 
therefore fully characterized by the choice of fi'. 
Let D denote the productivity of a consumer who would have pre-tax labor in- 
come  under the high marginal rate tax  schedule r, and tD' denote the productiv- 
ity of  a consumer who would have pre-tax labor income  under the low marginal 
rate tax schedule i-':9 
t((cs, i3ü) =  (2.2) 
üi't(a', 3'i') = .  (2.3) 
The following lemma establishes that a lower productivity level is required under 
the T' schedule to achieve the pre-tax income level g: 
Lemma 1  'iL' > iD' >0. 
8.  A productivity.specific  price  is not feasible, as producrivities are assumed to be unobservable. 
An income-specific price, equivalent  to introducing non-linear  income taxation,  might be Pareto- 
superior to our scheme but would be more dicult  to design. 
9.  u and i'  are uniquely defined since  £2 > 0. linear income tax schedules  8 
Proofi  The second  inequality follows from the assumption that £2 > 0 and the fact that 7> 0. 
From eqs. (2.2) and (2.3), we have 
tDt(a,  /3rD)  =  tD't(a', /3'tD') 
>  tD't(a, /3'ta') 
>  tD't(a,/3t3'), 
since a > a', /3 < 3', Li < 0 and £2 >  0. Now the function  wt(x, yw) is strictly increasing in w 
for all positive z and y. Therefore,  tD > ti". 
We can now demonstrate 
Proposition 1  Low productivity  consumers (w ￿  tD') choose tax schedule r. 
High productivity  consumers (w ￿  zD) choose tax  schedule T'. 
Proofi  Let (c,t) and (c',V') denote the preferred  bundles  at the income  levels and rela- 
tive prices implied, respectively, by tax schedules r and r' (they are computed  along the lines 
suggested in section  1). 
Consider first a low productivity  consumer  (w  <  tD'). Since pre-tax labor income  rises with 
productivity,  and given the definition of  iD' in eq. (23), we have wL' < .  But then, from eq. 
(2.1), 
SI  !  I  •1 
—a+(l—/3)wL <—a +(1—fl)wt 
which implies that 
a+/3wt'￿ cs'+/D'wL'=c'.  (2.4) 
Hence the bundle (ce', £')  is affordable at the income and relative price level implied by sched- 
ule r. But (c,  £) is the preferred  bundle for that schedule. Since preferences  are strictly quasi- 
concave, we must have u(c,t) > u(c',t), so  that a low productivity consumer  always 
chooses the r schedule. 
The proof  for high productivity  consumers (w > tD) is symmetrical:  it obtains by circular  permu- 
tation of primed and non-primed a,  j3 and L  variables. 
Productivity therefore provides the criterion according to which consumers sort 
themsel.'es between the two tax  schedules: workers with very low (high) produc- 
tivity never (always) find it worthwhile to "buy" a reduction in their marginal tax 
rate. 
In the absence of tighter restrictions on the utility function, we cannot say pre- 
cisely which tax schedule will be chosen by which consumer with intermediate 
10.  Notice that the proof  relies heavily on our assumption that the wage elasticity of  labor supply 
is positive; were £2 equal  to zero, we  would have iJi' = iii. 9  Alesina & Weil 
productivity  (those for whom tD' < w < tD). This is because, under the new tax 
schedule, these consumers both work and consume more. Depending on the de- 
gree of substitutability between consumption and leisure, the latter effect may or 
may not  dominate  the former.  For consumers at either end of the income distribu- 
tion, this ambiguity can be lifted, as established above. What we however know, 
by continuity, is that there is an odd number of consumers who are indifferent 
between the two tax schedules." 
The possibility, which cannot be ruled out,12 that there are many consumers in- 
different between  the two schedules, in  general prohibits implementing our menu 
scheme as a standard  simple piecewise linear income tax function. As we shall 
see below, this multiplicity is however no impediment to the determination  of the 
revenue  effects of the introduction  of a second linear tax schedule. 
2.2  Government revenues 
To study the effect of the introduction  of the second  tax schedule r'  on govern- 
ment revenues, it is useful—as  suggested by the foregoing  analysis—to separately 
consider low, intermediate  and high productivity workers. 
Low productiviry workers  We have shown above that low productivity consumers 
(w < tD') choose the r  schedule. Tax collection from these workers is thus not 
affected by the introduction  of the second tax schedule. 
Intermediate  productivity  workers  While we do not precisely know who, among 
intermediate  productivity workers (tii <w <zD'), will opt for the new tax sched- 
ule, we can guarantee that anybody who chooses r'  ends up paying more taxes 
than what he had paid under r: 
Proposition 2 Any consumer with intermediate productivity  ('s'  w 
pays more taxes under tax schedule r' than under tax schedule r. 
Proofi  Under  tax schedule T, intermediate consumers  have labor income  wt  < y, and thus 
pay, from eq. (2.1),  taxes no greater than 1, with consumer  0) paying 1. Under tax schedule  TI, 
11.  Consumer  0)' prefers schedule  T , consumer 0)> 0)' prefers schedule r', and indirect  utility 
functions  are continuous under our assumptions. 
12.  See the appendix for an example of  a sutcient condition guaranteeing the existence  of  a 
unique indifferent  consumer. Linear income tax schedules  10 
intermediate  consumers  have labor income wi."  ,  and thus pay taxes no smaller than 1, with 
consumer  iii' paying t. 
Therefore, the existence of  intermediate  productivity consumers who choose  the 
r' tax schedule increases the government's tax revenues. 
High  productivity  workers  We have shown above that all consumers with produc- 
tivity higher than tD opt for tax schedule r'. The impact on tax revenues of the 
adoption  of this tax schedule by high productivity consumers is best understood 
by decomposing it into two parts. First, at their old labor supply £, high produc- 
tivity consumers would pay less taxes under T' than under T since wt < — 
an effect which raises, ceteris paribus, their tax bill and which is the stronger 
the more productive the worker. Second, labor supply and thus labor income in- 
crease under r'  because this new schedule offers a lower marginal tax rate—an 
effect which increases the tax bill and which is the  stronger the more elastic labor 
supply is relative to the wage rate.13 
There will therefore be  two types of high productivity consumers: those for whom 
the second  effect dominates the first (and who will consequently pay more taxes), 
and those for whom the first effect dominates the second (and who will pay less 
taxes) 
14 
Designing, for any given 'r, a menu of linear income tax schedules which is not 
revenue-decreasing therefore requires  that tax authorities  make sure that the 
possible decrease in taxes levied from the some of the high productivity agents 
does nor offset the revenue  gains from intermediate workers and from those high 
productivity workers who end up paying more taxes. 
The following  argument, based on the possible  existence of an upper-limit to the 
productivity distribution, shows that this goal can always be attained  by designing 
the tax system appropriately: 
13. The second  effect is clearly absent if, contrary to our assumptions, labor supply were inelastic 
(t2 = 0). In that case, as follows from footnote 10, tax collections from consumers with income 
below  would  be unchanged  under our scheme,  while those from income  above  would  go 
down—an  outcome incompatible  with  budget balance. The feasibility of our scheme  thus cru- 
cially hinges on a positive  wage elasticity of  labor  supply. 
14.  If we were willing to restrict preferences  further to ensure  that income  effects are well- 
behaved,  we would  be able  to identify  the first group of  consumers  with  "upper-middle  class' 
workers who have a producrivity larger than, but close to tS, and  the second  group with "upper 
class" consumers  with incomes at the high end of the income distribution. 11  Alesiria & \Veil 
Proposition 3 If  there is a highest producti  vity level Wm, then itis always  possi- 
ble to design schedule T' in  such a way that its introduction  results in an increase 
in government  revenues: for any desired decrease in the marginal  tax  rate, it  suf- 
fices to  pick  equal to the  pre-tax income under r of  the largest  taxpayer 
Proof  Pick an arbitrary tax schedule rand a /3' > /3 (i.e., select a lower marginal tax rate). If 
= 
we have, using (2.2), 
W = Wm. 
This construction  guarantees,  using the rults of  propositions  1 and 2, that government  revenues 
will increase: because  üi =  Wmax, the only consumers who choose r' are "intermediate" workers 
(with productivity  between i'  and wm) who pay more taxes. 
The condition of the proposition  is of course overly strong, for it is a sufficient 
but not necessary condition for our scheme to be successful. An alternative  suf- 
ficient condition—which we view as uninteresting—would of course be that the 
economy be on the decreasing side of the Laffer curve, on which tax revenues 
increase when the marginal rate goes down. It  must however be emphasized that 
the revenue-increasing  features of our plan do not hinge, as the condition of 
proposition 3 makes clear, on such circumstances. Instead,  the feasibility of our 
scheme proceeds from the desirability for high productivity tax payers of a tax 
package offering reduced marginal tax rates in exchange of a larger lump-sum 
component of the tax bill. 
One must note at this juncture, that our scheme provides a global implementa- 
tion of the well-known (Sadka [1977]) but local result that optimal tax sched- 
ules must  feature "no distortion at the top" by setting the marginal tax rate of 
the most able taxpayer, if she exists, equal to zero. By offering a menu  of lin- 
ear income tax schedules, our plan provides the opportunity to many workers to 
"purchase" a low marginal tax rate—a  Pareto-improving approximation, relative 
to the single T scheme, of the (perhaps too complex or unknown, and in general 
non-linear)  optimal income tax function which must be flat at its endpoint.  As 
the computations presented below will show, a large fraction of the population 
may in practice choose to take advantage of the low marginal rate tax schedule. 
Our menu scheme, because it is implementable even in the presence of multi- 
ple indifferent consumers, has thus much wider applicability that Seade's [1977] Linear income tax schedules  12 
previous attempt to explore the non-local implications of the "no distortion  at 
the top." His  implementation, in contrast  with ours, is of little practical guidance 
because, although  not strictly confined to the top taxpayer, it only affects a mi- 
nuscule fraction of the population  and is thus extremely sensitive to changes in 
the top of the income distribution. 
As our goal—establishing that the introduction  of a menu of linear income tax 
schedules enables the government  to  raise more revenue—is attained  by the fore- 
going analysis, and as additional results cannot  be derived without  tighter specifi- 
cation of the utility function, we do not pursue further the analysis of the  general 
case. We instead construct an example which, although  it does not satisfy all the 
assumptions of our theoretical analysis, illustrates in a simple manner the issues 
at hand, how our scheme may in practice be implemented, and its effects on the 
tax bill of various sections of the population. 
3  An example 
Assume that the utility function  of our consumers is: 
u(c,) = ac—S _____t1+8  a,0> 0,  1+0 
so that optimal consumption, labor supply and indirect  utility  of an agent of type 
w facing only schedule i- are 
c*  =  a +  a11'(f3w)(1+B)/'8, 
=  (a18w)'°, 
=  aa + ___(a/3w)(1+9)/'8.  1+0 
Thus, the wage elasticity of labor supply is equal to 1/0. 
Similarly, optimal consumption, labor supply and indirect utility of an agent of 
type w facing schedule T' only are 
c1  =  a' + ah/O(/3w)(1lG)$, 
=  (a/3'w)"°, 
=  acr' + ____(a/3Fw)(1+0)h/9.  1+0 13  Alesina & Weil 
It is straightforward to show that when offered a choice between the two tax 
schedules r  and T, any agent with productivity above (below) a critical  level ti 
will choose schedule r' (r)'5,  where, using eq.  (2.1), 
-—  1+0  aa  31  — 
0  ah/9(fiu(1+O)/9 
— /3(1+9)19) 
3.1  Necessary  and sufficient condition 
We now derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the introduction  of a sec- 
ond tax schedule to be revenue-increasing. For any given a, /3 and  3' > /3, let 
z(w, )  denote the change in the tax bill of consumer w if  he opts for r'  instead of 
i- when the income level at which the two schedules intersect is V—i.e, when all 
consumers with productivity larger than ti' choose schedule r'.  Using equations 
(2.1)  and (3.1), it is easy to show that 
z(w, i) = a9  — 
/3(1+O)IOj,(i+G)IO 
— fi)flFi/9 — (1 — 
fi)/31/9Jw(1+9)/9]  (3.2) 
Assume, to make the analysis interesting, that /9 and /3' are greater  than (1 +  0)_i 
(otherwise, the economy is on the downward-sloping side of the Laffer curve) 16 
The change in tax revenues  stemming from the introduction  of T' is thus 
R(si') = f z(w, t1) dF(w), 
since only consumers with productivity larger than tZ' choose tax schedule r'. 
Since /3' — /3 > 0 by assumption, we immediately find that R(tZ) > 0 if and 
only if 




0  j3i(1+9)/9 — /9(1+0)10 
where 
fx0(a/3)hIOw(+e)IO  dF(w) 
f°°dF(w) 
15.  Consumer  iZ) is indifferent  between the two schedules since, for him, U  = U'. 
16.  For any given  cs, a and  w, the tax revenue function  —a + (1 
— /3)w(aJ3w)'/9 reaches a 
maximum—the  top of the Laffer curve, at  = (1 + O)_l. Linear income tax schedules  14 
denotes  the average pre-tax income, prior to the introduction  of the r' schedule, 
of consumers with productivity larger than x. 
According to equation (3.3), government revenues will thus increase if and only 
if, measured prior to the introduction  of the menu of tax schedules, the pre-tax 
income of the consumer of type tZi relative to the average income of consumers 
with productivity bigher than tZ' exceeds the value on the right-hand  side of the 
inequality. 
One can always construct the schedule i-' to satisfy this inequality. Since 3' > 
/3 > 1, the right-hand  side of (3.3) is strictly smaller than 1,  while the left-hand 
side converges to  1  as tD tends to co. Therefore, for any given a, /3 and /3' such 
that /3' > /3 > 1, one can always find a tZ' (or, equivalently by (3.1), an a') which 
satisfies (3.3). 
In particular, following the suggestion of proposition  3, it is easy to show that 
selecting  equal to the income of the largest taxpayer—when such an individual 
exists—satisfies inequality (3.3) whichever the shape F(.). 
3.2  Numerical simulations 
We consider two stylized cases. First, a "U.S" economy with an original marginal 
tax rate of 33%, and then a "Swedish"  economy (or a U.S. economy of  yesteryear) 
with a 60% marginal tax rate. 
We assume that productivities  follow a r(a, b) distribution,  and choose its pa- 
rameters  to fit as closely as possible the empirical distribution of income in each 
country  for plausible wage elasticities of labor supply 1/O.  The resulting  model 
parameters  are  reported in Table 1. 
Our numerical exercises illustrate three basic properties of the model: 
•  The larger the original marginal tax rate, the larger the fraction of the 
population  which will select the new tax schedule  with lower marginal 
rate but higher intercept which we introduce. 
17.  Let g(x)  x(°)'8/(1 +  0)—  It  is straightforward to show that 1' > /3> 1  and 0 > 0 
imply that g(/3')  <g(/3)—which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the righthand  side of 
eq. (3.3) to be smaller than 1 when /3' > /3. 
18.  See Salem and Mount [1976] for a justi1cation  of  the use of  the r  distribution  to model the 
income distribution,  and McDonald  and Rensom  [19791 for details on the estimation technique. 15  Alesina & Weil 
•  The larger the reduction in the marginal rate offered by the second sched- 
ule relative to the first, the larger the increase in the intercept required 
to maintain revenue neutrality, and the fewer the number of taxpayers 
who will choose the new schedule. In other terms, the lump-sum "price" 
which must be paid to take advantage of the new schedule rises when the 
reduction  in the marginal rate becomes larger; 
•  The smallest the wage elasticity of labor supply, the smaller the fraction 
of the population  choosing the new tax schedule. 
The last observation suggests that our scheme has significant implications only 
for economies with relatively high labor elasticities. One should however note 
that when the labor income elasticity is small, the distortiorsary costs of taxation 
are small—so that one should not be overly worried about tax distortions in the 
first place! 
In the "U.S." case, Table 2 shows that it is possible to offer  a moderate  (5%) 
Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral decrease in the marginal tax rate, and still 
have, if the wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.8, 11% of the population choosing 
to take advantage of the new, lower tax rate. If a more drastic cut (18%)  in the 
marginal tax rate is desired, however, the revenue neutrality constraint imposes 
that the "price" to be paid  by consumers to take advantage of this new low rate be 
so high that only the top 2% of the taxpayers will participate in the scheme—as 
illustrated in Thble 3. The more elastic labor supply is, the larger the fraction of 
consumers who will choose to take advantage of the lower marginal rate schedule. 
The results are of  course more spectacular in  the "Swedish"  case when the original 
marginal tax rate is close to (but still to the left of) the top of the LafTer curve. 
A revenue neutral decrease in the marginal rate from 60% to 50% would affect 
more than half of the population  if the wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.6, and 
close to a quarter when it is 0.4 (Table 4). A schedule offering a decrease in the 
marginal tax rate from 60% to 30% (while increasing the average tax rate  enough 
to maintain  revenue  neutrality) would still be selected by 20% of the population 
if the elasticity of labor is 0.6 (Table 5) 19 
For both the U.S. and Swedish cases, it is straightforward to show that the effect 
10.  These values slightly overstate our case, as we are implicitly assuming that there is initially 
only one 60% tax bracket from which all the consumers choosing the new schedule  originate.  In 
practice,  however, it is often tiue (in particular  in the "Swedish" case) that all consumers but the 
very poorest  ones are subject to the highest  marginal tax rate. Linear income tax schedules  16 
of our scheme is to shift the pre-tax income distribution to the right. 
Although these numbers are only illustrative, they emphasize i) that our  proposal 
is most relevant for countries with high marginal tax rates, as it is in those coun- 
tries that the welfare gains of offering to sell the income tax are greatest; and ii) 
that large reductions in marginal rates for a large fraction of the population  are 
achievable without  decreasing government revenue  even if the economy is on the 
upward-sloping side of the Laffer curve if  the fisc "sells" its right of distortionary 
taxation to the public. 
4  Discussion 
4.1  Implementation  as a piecewise linear tax schedule 
An interesting  question is whether the Pareto improvement achieved  by a menu 
of two tax schedules can  be obtained  by modifying the original tax  schedule, with- 
Out offering to taxpayers the choice between two schedules. As we showed above, 
workers with "intermediate" productivity levels do not  sort themselves monoton- 
ically; that is, there exists workers who choose the new tax schedules who are less 
productive than some of the workers who choose the original schedule. Thus, un- 
less one is willing to design extremely complex (and fragile) tax rules, our scheme 
is best implemented—and the proposed Pareto improvement achieved—not  by 
designing a piecewise linear income tax schedule but instead by using a menu of 
schedules and letting consumers sort themselves out, often in a non-monotonic 
fashion, according to their best self-interest. 
4.2  A menu of N tax schedules 
A menu of more than two schedules can provide further welfare improvements. 
One could introduce a third tax schedule, with a lower marginal rate and a higher 
intercept (i.e., a lower lump sum transfer) than the second schedule. An appro- 
priate choice of parameters,  along the lines described in the previous section, 
improves upon the scheme with two schedules. This argument can be repeated 
for N schedules. Note, in particular, that nothing  rules out a zero marginal rate for 
the Nth (last)  schedule chosen  by the most productive workers. Needless to say, 
the magnitude of N is constrained  by the administrative costs of an excessively 
complicated tax system. 17  Alesina & Weil 
4.3  Piecewise linear functions 
An immediate generalization of our results implies that any piecewise linear tax 
schedule, such as those studied by Sheshinski [1989], can be Pareto dominated, 
without reducing tax revenues, by introducing one or more new tax schedules. 
The second tax schedule has a marginal rate lower than the highest one  of the 
original piecewise linear schedule and the new schedule intersect the old one 
only once. ° In this case the existence of a kink in the original tax schedule does 
not affect in any way the proofs of the results shown in Sections 2 and 321 
These  results lead to a comment on the optimality of discontinuous piecewise lin- 
ear schedules. Our preceding analysis suggests that the optimal piecewise linear 
tax schedule is discontinuous for any non-degenerate social welfare functions— 
in contradiction  with Sheshinski's  [1989]  results on the shape of the optimal 
piecewise linear income tax schedule.22  The discontinuity of the tax schedule of- 
fers the planner the Pareto-improving opportunity of decreasing the marginal tax 
rate of high productivity consumers. A social planner will thus in general find it 
optimal to design, within the class of piecewise linear schedules, a discontinuous 
income tax function—or, equivalently, a menu of linear income tax schedules. 
5  Conclusion 
Menus of multiple income  tax schedules can Pareto-improve upon traditional 
linear or piecewise  linear income tax schedules without reducing tax revenues. 
By offering a choice between different tax schedules the government "sells" the 
right of a lower marginal rate in exchange for a higher lump sum contribution. 
The more productive taxpayers find it in their interest to buy this reduction  of 
marginal tax rates. Multiple tax schedules thus introduce discontinuities into the 
pre-tax distribution of income. 
20.  If the two tax schedules  intersect twice,  the second  schedule  can be defined  in such a way 
that is available only for tax payers with  an income higher than the lower intercept. 
21.  If this is not the case, the proofs have to be slightly generalized with no qualitative changes 
in the results. Also, note that, in principle,  it is not impossible that the conditions for revenue 
neutrality could be  satisfied even  if  < y. However, the range of parameter  values for which 
this is possible is likely to be small. 
22.  This observation has been confirmed recently in independent  work by Slemrod et al. [1991], 
who point out the mistake in Sheshinski's  proof. Linear income tax schedules  18 
This result is related to the "no distortions at the top" principle of the optimal 
taxation literature, which implies that the derivative of the optimal tax sched- 
ule should be zero for the most productive taxpayer. Our results generalize this 
principle: it applies more globally, and does not rely upon the existence of a well 
defined and identified "most productive tax payer." In addition, our scheme is 
relatively easy to implement—particularly if the number of schedules is not too 
high—and  unlikely to produce perverse results in the presence of  gradual changes 
in the income distribution. 
Numerical simulations suggest that for economies with relatively high marginal 
rates at the top  (but still in the upward sloping part of the Laffer  curve)  the 
marginal rates of a relatively large fraction of the population could be cut with- 
out reducing tax revenues. In economies with relatively low marginal rates at the 
top, such as the United States, our scheme would affect the marginal rates of a 
small but not trivial fraction of the population. Our scheme is more likely to be 
successful and affect a larger fraction of the population the more elastic is the 
labor supply to the after tax wage. If the trend of increasing women participation 
in the labor force continues, this elasticity is likely to be increasing. 
Finally, it should be noted that our scheme makes the income distribution  more 
unequal, which might be an undesirable feature politically. However, our pro- 
posed scheme is a Pareto-improvement: the rich are getting  richer—but  not at 
the expense of the poor. 19  Alesina & Weil 
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Appendix 
Under additional assumptions on the strength of income  effects, one can lift any ambi- 
guity as to the behavior of intermediate  productivity workers. A sufficient condition  is 
given  by 
Proposition A If u 
— u2u11 > 0, there exists a unique  tZ', si" < ti < D, such that I) 
consumer  D is indifferent between schedules  T and r'; ii) consumers with productivity 
lower (higher) than i'  strictly  prefer  schedule r (r'). 
Proofi  Let v[a, /3w] = u[a + /3w(a,  /3w), £(c,  j3w)] denote the indirect utility of  a consumer of 
type w facing schedule z-. Let 
L(w)= v[a',/l'wJ—v[a,,Ow] 
denote the utility  gain (or loss, if negative)  of choosing schedule r' over schedule r. Applying 
the envelope  theorem, we have 
as  =  /3't'u' — /3tt4 
as  f(cr',/3',w)—f(a,13,w). 
Dropping the * 
superscripts  for  ease of  notation, it is straightforward to show that 
=  /3u11 + -{u  + (ulaul 
— usuii)t} <0 
fp  —{(u 
— u2uiit)t + /3wt2[u + (uu1 
— u2u11)e]} > 0. 
The property that f, < 0 follows from assumptions 3 and 4, and while the result that fs >  0 
requires, in addition,  the condition of  the proposition. 
Thus,  since a' < a and /3'  >  /3 by construction,  i!(w) > 0 for all w. Since '(.)  does not 
change sign, the ff, which solves (w) = o is unique. Existence  is guaranteed  by proposition  I, 
which shows that (w) < 0 for w < zT/ and (w) > 0 for w > üi. The  property (w) > 0 for 
all w > iD follows from '  > 0. 
Notice that, from assumption 4, 
t1 
— 5L2Uii > UjU12, 
so that the condition  of the proposition  is satisfied as soon  as income effects are "weak." 
This occurs, in particular, for all  utility function  for which u < 0.23 Similarly, utility 
23.  Sheshinski 119891  assumes, to prove that the optimal continuous  piecewise  tax schedule 
is convex, that income effects are non-increasing with productivity,  and that (in our notation) 
tii'4 (a', /3'Ji') < ti'f1 (a,  fltD). Regularity conditions  similar to these would lead to an alternative 
sufficient  condition  for the existence  of  a unique ü. 21  Alesina & Well 
functions  with curvature  in consumption C  —cujj/ui <  1 satisfy proposition A, since 
the condition  of the proposition  is equivalent,  using eq. (1.6), to 
a  c<1+—. 
3wt Table 1:  Model Parameters 
Labor Elasticity (1/8)  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0 
TopofLafferCurve  0.833  0.714  0.625  0.556  0.500 
United  States  (1988) 
Mean Income  $24,054 
1.65  2.15  2.66  3.21  3.82 
0.70  0.80  0.90  1.05  1.10 
mean  w  2.35  2.69  2.95  3.06  3.47 
median w  1.90  2.29  2.59  2.74  3.17 
variance of  w  3.35  3.36  3.28  2.91  3.15 
Sweden  (1985) 
Mean Income = 77,900  Kr 
0.99  1.18  1.39  1.61  1.85 
0.30  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.40 
mean to  3.29  3.95  3.98  4.04  4.62 
median to  2.27  2.91  3.08  3.24  3.82 
variance of  to  10.96  13.15  11.37  10.09  11.55 Table 2: "U.s.,' Tax Cut from 33% to 28% 
Labor Elasticity (1/0)  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0 
% of agents affected  O.Ot  0.4  3.6  10.8  21.4 
"price"  14,735  7,443  4,766  3,261  2,290 
equiv. consumption  gain  0.0  O.O  0.3  1.0  1.9 
critical income  292,556  146,706  93,260  63,336  44,151 
revenue-neutral  income  300,287  150,993  97,375  67,090  47,446 
%whopaymoretax  O.Ot  O.Ot  O.U  O.Ot  O.Ot 
% who pay less  tax  O.Ot  0.5  3.6  10.8  21.4 
% affected who pay more tax  11.6  O.Ot  0.O  0.O  O.O 
% affected who pay less tax  88.4  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9 
NOThS: 
indicates a number rounded down toO. 
Labor elasticity is the wage  elasticity of labor suppIc 
"Price'  is the lump  suns tax the agent would have to 'pay' to be allowed to  take advantage of the lower 
marginal  tax rate. 
E.quivaler  consumption gain is the fraction of  additional consumption (in$) which would make the average 
agent indifferent  to the existence of the new tax schedule. 
Critical  income is the income level above which agents  opt for the new tax  schedule. 
Revenue.neucra]  income is the income below which  agents  who  have opted for the new  schedule pay  more 
tax, while those  above pay less. 
% who pay esore/less  tax  shows the breakdown of agents affected by  rise new schedule as a fraction  of tise 
entire population. 
% ecred who pay  moreiless tax shows the breakdown only  of agents  who  opt for the new schedule. Table 3:  'U.S.' Tax Cut from 33% to 15% 
Labor Elasticity (1/8)  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0 
% of agents affected  0.01  0.01  0.5  2.3  5.9 
"price"  79,748  44,024  30,769  23,001  17,741 
equiv. consumption  gain  O.Ot  O.Ot  0.2  0.9  2.4 
critical  income  432,180  232,683  158,576  115,572  86,891 
revenue-neurral  income  454,825  255,995  182,913  139,806  110,235 
% who pay more rax  OUt  O.O  0.Ot  O.O  0.Ot 
% who pay less  tax  0.01  O.Ot  0.5  2.3  5.9 
% affected who pay more tax  5.0  0.2  O.Ot  o.o  O.0 
% affected who pay less tax  95.0  99.8  99.9  99.9  99.9 
NOTES 
t  indicates a number rounded down toO. 
Labor  elasticity is the wage elasticity  of labor supply. 
"Price" is  the lump sum tax the agent would  have to 'pay' to be allowed to rake advantage of the  lower 
marginal  tax rate. 
Eeuivalenc  consumption  gain is the fraction  of  additional  consumption (in$) which  would  make the average 
agent indifferent to the existence  of the new tax schedule. 
Critical income is the income  level above  which agents opt for the new tax schedule. 
Revenue.neutral income  is the income below  which agents  who have opted for the new  schedule pay more 
tax, while those above pay less. 
% who pay more/less  tax shows  the breakdown of agents affected by the new schedule  as a fraction of the 
entire population. 
% affected who pay more/less  tax shows  the breakdown  only of  agents who opt for the new  schedule. Table 4: "Swedish" Tax Cut from 60% to 50% 
Labor Elasticity (1/0)  0.2  0.4  0.6 
%ofagentsaffected  2.1  21.2  52.2 
"price"  40,654  14,834  5,104 
equiv. consumption  gain  0.8  8.1  18.0 
critical  income  397,202  141,585  47,578 
revenue-neutral  income  425601  154,805  54,394 
%whopaymoretax  0.2  O.0  O.Ot 
% who pay less tax  1.9  21.2  52.2 
% affected who pay mote tax  7.6  O.O  O.Ot 
% affected who pay less tax  92.4  99.9  99.9 
NOTES: 
indicates a number rounded down toO. 
Labor elasticity  is the wage  elasticity of labor supply. 
"Price" is the lump  sum  tax the agent would  have to 'pay' to be allowed  to take advantage of the lower 
marginal  tax nate. 
Equivalent consumption gain is the fraction of additional consumption (in Kr.)  which would make the 
average  agent indifferent to the existence  of the new tax schedule. 
Ceitical  income  is the income level above  which agents opt for the new tax schedule, 
Revenue.neutral income  is the income below  which agents  who have opted for the new  schedule pay more 
tax, while those above pay less. 
% who pay more/less  tax shows  the breakdown  of agents  affected by the new schedule as a fraction  of the 
entire population. 
% affecred who pay more/less  tax shows the breakdown  on'y of agents who opt lot  the new  schedule. Table 5: "Swedish" Tax Cut from 60% to 30% 
Labor Elasticity (1/6)  0.2  0.4  0.6 
% of  agents  affected  0.2  5.9  19.3 
"price"  215,856  104,796  59,213 
equiv. consumption  gain  03  8.4  28.0 
critical  income  676,490  308,472  163,541 
income of tax burden  switch  761,025  385,901  228,796 
%whopaymoretax  0.Q  O.Ot  O.Ot 
% who pay less tax  0.2  5.9  19.3 
% affected who pay more tax  2.9  O.O  O.Ot 
% affected who pay less tax  97.1  99.9  99.9 
NOTES: 
indicates a number rounded down toO. 
Labor elasticity  is the wage elasticity  of labor supply. 
Pric&'  is the lump suni  tax the agent would  have to pay' to be allowed  to take advantage of the lower 
marginal  tax rate. 
Equivalent consumption gain  is  the fraction of additional consumption (in Kr.)  which would make the 
average  agent indifferent  to the existence  of the new  tax schedule. 
Critical income  is the income  level above  which agenta  opt for the new tax schedule. 
Revenue-neutral income  is the income below  which  agenta who have opted for the new schedule  pay more 
tax, while those above pay less. 
% who pay more/less  tax shows  the breakdown of agenta affected  by the new schedule as a fraction  of  the 
entire population. 
% ecred who pay more/less  tax shows  the breakdown  only of  agents who opt for the new  schedule. 